DECONSTRUCTION, ONTOLOGY AND LITERATURE

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ABSTRACT

This essay considers a new phenomenological and ontological study and review of deconstructionism and its trends. The authors aim to face the advocates of this methodology who blindly believes that deconstruction is a destruction of the text and metaphysics in an arbitrary way, with some ambiguities which are seen mostly among its practitioners for a better clarification of the method. The theoretical and analytical representations of historical facts about deconstruction, as a method which underpins mostly all the aspects of literature and interdisciplinary courses, reveals that its original bases and present understandings of this methodology have not reasonably enough stayed the same. It is further suggested to stick to Johnsonian (Barbara) rules in deconstructive criticism to keep its genuineness and originality.

Keywords: Phenomenological, ontological, deconstructionism, destruction, literature, metaphysics

1. INTRODUCTION

Deconstruction as a radical trend in criticism has brought almost most of the powerful concepts under its influence. That’s why, naturally and spontaneously, any intervention in its techniques, bases and philosophical backgrounds or misinterpretation in its definition and in practice is expected to be seen. However, among all the probable misuses and misinterpretations which can be attributed to deconstructionism relying on the amplitude of hands in it, 1, as it is worth, can take three of the most prevalent ones in consideration and elaboration through three questions which we have sought to find cogent answers. 1. What are the roots and fundamental basics which deconstructionism was founded on and from what philosophical trends has it come up by Derrida? 2. Following all those roots as constituent part of deconstructionism, is it right to take deconstructionism as destruction of the text or meaning or whatever it may be thought by different individual? 3. If that is so, as many are defending it, what happens for the literature?

However, in any case, the major forerunners are Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Saussure and Heidegger. In its most virile and virulent form deconstruction shows itself more meta-critical than critical (Vincent 2001). “A s soon as any radically innovative thought becomes an – “ism”, its specific groundbreaking force diminishes, its historical notoriety increases, and its disciples tend to become more simplistic, more dogmatic, and ultimately more conservative, at which time its power becomes institutional rather than analytical” (Johnson 1980). Thus, accordingly, she distinguishes two groups in facing the deconstructionism as saying “I would like to begin by examining briefly two types of accusations commonly directed against deconstruction, the literality conservative, which accuses deconstruction of going too far, and the politically radical, which accuse deconstruction of not going far enough. The first type comes from well-established men of letters who attempt to defend their belief in the basic communicability of meanings and values against what is said to be the deconstructionists' relativism, nihilism, or self-indulgent love of meaninglessness”. However, what are the main concerns in deconstruction trend and what is the reason for such concerns? Why there has to be many definitions if there is any at all, about deconstruction? And the most important of all, why, according to what Barbara Johnson stated earlier, varied groups enter into this trend? Do not all these differentiations and explications represent a sort of misunderstanding and misconception of deconstruction which has resulted in clarification? That is why a theoretical survey in the true nature of deconstruction is vital to be considered.
2. DISCUSSION

2.1. DECONSTRUCTION OVERVIEW

Historical study of progression of deconstruction during the time is of great help to find out the basics from which it was formed. It is important, in the first place, to know how it has been adopted and practiced to discover its importance. Several groups comprise the "corporation" of development of Deconstruction. First a band of French intellectuals associated in the late 1960s and early 1970s including most prominently Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Julia Kristeva. Second, some American figures, residing at Yale University since the early 1970s, encompasses Harold Bloom, Paul de Man, Geoffrey Hartman and J. Hillis Miller, and the most famous of all, Jaquette Derrida which binds both companies. Third, a klatch of young French intellectual, linked with Derrida during the late 1970s, Sylviane Agacins, Sarah Kofman, Philippe Iacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc Nancy. A number of other ranking intellectuals, connected with one or more of these groups or people, brings to the "movement" Gilles Deleuze, Eugenio Donato, Rodolphe Gaschg, Barbara Johnson, Jacques Lacan, Jean-Rangois Lyotard, Jeffrey Hehlman, EdHard Said and Cayatri Spivak. Positively or negatively, many minds are taken with deconstruction.

In essence, so many great philosophers and intellectuals helped extension of deconstructionism as it is nowadays though, the main question remains yet unanswered. Considering these giants' supporting the bases of the trend, does it make deconstructionism as rightly understood by all? Julian Wolfreys in his book 'critical keywords in literary and cultural theory (2003) states:

"Deconstruction is conventionally recognized as a school or method of criticism equally conventionally,[...]. This is however, a misunderstanding that is all the more appallingly and hilariously inaccurate because it is so widespread and so eagerly accepted, accepted we might suggest without ever having been thought about or considered carefully; [...] Chambers dictionary is equally inaccurate, as are many other dictionaries, encyclopedia, guides to critical theory and even books the principle subject of which is, allegedly, deconstruction. According to such conventional narratives, Derrida's method' of reading, which apparently sought to unearth contradictions and paradoxes in the logical structures of philosophical and literary texts, became adopted in North American universities from late 1960s and in British universities from the early 1980s" (42).

What is important in statement, is that deconstruction since Derrida, due to its popularity, was blindly accepted without being much thought of, which later we would expatiate on it more. Maybe in essence, what we know of deconstruction as such, is just a misunderstanding or a misconception of a misconception which was adopted prematurely and precociously over the thought of considering it as something substantially proven.

Peggy Kamuf (1997 p.77) represents deconstruction as "concerning the institution that is the university [...]the term deconstruction is most often presumed to refer to a theory, a method, a school, perhaps even a doctrine, in any case some identifiable or localizable thing that can be positioned-posed and opposed- within that institution, but also that can be excluded from within this defined enclosure" (Critical Keywords 46)

Here, Peggy Kamuf reiterates which the term deconstruction in essence can be ambiguous in both the range of definition and scale of practice which would surely intrigue our sense of doubt about its true understanding and among those who claim being deconstructionists. To clarify more on the subject, it is also worth beholding what J.Hillis Miller, one of the principle practitioners and theoreticians of deconstructionism state as saying"

"Sentences of the form 'deconstruction is so and so' are a contradiction in terms. Deconstruction cannot by definition be defined, since it presupposes the indefinability or, more properly 'undecidability' of all conceptual or generalizing terms. Deconstruction, like any method of interpretation, can only be exemplified, and the examples will of course all differ" (Abrams 2009 p.74) . Difference in examples may connote the various ways to which perform deconstruction which indicates idiosyncrasy in its performance and practice in which, surely, deviation from the straight true line will occur by profusion of individuals and minds when each one has his/her
own system of defining the deconstruction since there is no common definition even among the principle extenders of it in essence.

Accordingly, Barbara Johnson is trying to set off an explicit version of deconstructionism through its problematic points which is so smart. But it would be of great help to check a little of Heidegger’s ideas which more or less, long ago had talked critically about the notion of the text and philosophy as fundamental basics. That will clear Barbara Johnson’s probable ambiguities in her trend of explaining it.

2.2. DECONSTRUCTION AND TRUE ESSENCE

In an essay by Chung-chin Yi, professor of literature in Singapore argues about Heidegger’s destruction and Derrida’s critique of it in his deconstruction. Studying what he discusses may take us nearer to find out whether deconstruction is destruction or something beyond that. Heidegger focuses more on the metaphysics of western literature saying that “metaphysics has reached its end and the truth needs be rethought”. In his idea, metaphysics has sustained reality for long and is in decline now. Heidegger is trying to depict that philosophy is the destruction of the history of ontology:

“We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being- the ways which have guided us ever since. (Heidegger, 1962:44)”

But he further explains that destruction is not liquidating, but rather putting aside and dismantling assertions about philosophy which are merely historical and destroying the traditional content of ancient ontology means overcoming metaphysics by moving beyond philosophy as realism and idealism, which are primarily epistemological, into philosophy as ontology, which involves a primordial grasp of philosophy as the disclosure or un-concealing of Being. He comes up with Dasein as some objects which are ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand, which pragmatically means those constant parts of the text and philosophy which spontaneously exist in literature without any means of bringing them up as they already exist. So he shows that texts are based on naturally prioritizing concepts over each other which can be destroyed. Heidegger writes in What is Philosophy that destruction does not mean destroying but dismantling, liquidating, putting to one side the merely historical assertions about the history of philosophy. Pragmatically, Heidegger argues that the distinction between essentia and existentia that has held throughout the history of metaphysics presents an illusion and becomes groundless as both are united in Being, which is the ontological ground of both and thus precedes both. This separation between whatness and thatness of Being has thus approached its end because Being composes both simultaneously.

So, as it is seen, he argues to somehow alter something but Derrida says “Heidegger’s conflation of essence and existence in Being does nothing to alter the fundamental structure of metaphysics which he borrows from and thus affirms. As Derrida argues, (Derrida, 1980: 351) Heidegger inverts or negates metaphysics only to repeat it. Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics is thus a repetition of metaphysics in every sense of the word.

Derrida has taken much of Heidegger’s philosophy either inverted or directly copied for developing his own ideas of deconstruction. However, what Derrida himself defines as deconstruction will make it more apparent because before taking any actions in discussing about deconstruction, it is worth looking what the main proponent had meant. Derrida defines:

"From the beginning...there existed a certain Americanization of a certain deconstruction. by Americanization I [Derrida] mean a certain appropriation: a domestication, an institutionalization, chiefly academic, that took place elsewhere in other forms as well, but here in a massively visible fashion....And among the examples of these procedural and formalizing formula that I had proposed, and which were circulating precisely as possibilities, new possibilities offered by deconstruction, there was the reversal of a hierarchy. After having reversed a binary opposition...and after having liberated the subjugated and submissive term, one then proceeded to the generalization of this latter in new traits, producing a different concept [...], deconstruction hence is a body of possibilities, of faculties, indeed of facilities, in a word, a body of easily reproducible means, methods, and technical procedures, hence useful, utilizable, a body of rules and knowledge; a body of powerful know how...offered for didactic transmission,
susceptible of acquiring the academic status and dignity of a quasi-interdisciplinary discipline” (Wolfreys 43-44).

I have tried in this essay, to show how much these ideas are binding together and at the same time pushing themselves away. Firstly, Derrida believes in displacing the logics and metaphysics, occurred to me that in some parts he has generalized for the greater good because he has not been able to find any explanation. Derrida says that it is naive to refer to an event, doctrine or an author to designate the occurrence of decentering and a thinking of structurality of structure, as it is no doubt part of the totality of an era, but still it has always already begun to proclaim itself and begun to work.

If we pay a close attention to Derrida's own definition, nowhere and by no means he defines it as a standard and unilateral method which is constant in practice and for all. It is a method out of many ways which can be exerted on the text, therefore, it is possible for some so-called practitioners to have devised or mixed personal ideas and methods in the form of deconstruction and have given it credit to publicize. Is it not probable for Derrida's deconstruction to have undergone to radical shifts in nature by practitioners because of it being not a truly and strongly defined? And he also believes that everything is veiled by metaphysics as saying “There is no language outside metaphysics and the structures that determine it” (Yi 2010). Secondly, he says that no discourse escapes structure and the metaphysical constraints it imposes in the form of the structurality of structure, whether the center is affirmed or negated. As Derrida argues: "There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language – no syntax or lexicon- which is foreign to this history”. Julian Wolfreys quotes from Derrida in his book 'Critical Keywords' as saying "necessarily, since it [deconstruction] is neither a philosophy, nor a doctrine, nor a knowledge, nor a method, nor a discipline, not even a determinate concept, only what happens if it happens". It is as an event which takes place, which happens or comes to pass, if it takes place or happens at all (and nothing could be less certain), deconstruction therefore calls into question any possibility of a programme of reading and also any ontological process (Wolfreys 46).

Thus we might reach to this point that we have no language which is not already informed by metaphysical presuppositions; hence, all destructions of metaphysics that precede from within the confines of language repeat the metaphysics they seek to destroy. Destruction of metaphysics is yet metaphysics. I can ask my question that, how is possible to deconstruct a metaphysics as any logic can be decentred through a language which itself is metaphysics and logic base? Do we have at last, any destruction?

On the “Destruction of Ancient Ontology”, Heidegger writes in The End of Philosophy that metaphysics is something to be overcome: What does overcoming metaphysics mean? In the thinking of the history of Being, his rubric is used only as an aid for that thinking to be comprehensible at all. So it gets clear that even Derrida is heedfully opposing the Heidegger but he seems heedless when he gets to deconstruct as he reject the superiority of for instance, speech over writing, but he unconsciously is making another superiority hidden to the public.

Now, it is to take the metaphysics even deeper to the concept of phenomenology as Heidegger and Husserl were much concerned with. Husserl defines phenomenology as that in order to an understanding happen, we need a consciousness (Bressler 2007), to be pragmatically concise, but Heidegger argues that phenomenology, in place of intuition, privileges corporeality, embodiment, or being-in-the-world (Yi, 2010) . Heidegger collapses subject-object difference by suggesting that consciousness essentially belongs to being-in-the-world or concrete existence. This then will be eventually critiqued by Derrida as the privileging of transcendental subjectivity and presence. It shows that Derrida didn’t not stop just in the metaphysics in text, but he stretched farther in the intuitive privileges we have.

In addition, Derrida suggests that every instance of the destruction of metaphysics is in fact a repetition of it as it borrows entirely from the structure of metaphysics it sets out to destroy. And thus ultimately a destruction of metaphysics is simply a repetition or reproduction of it and hence, the same as metaphysics. Derrida thus discovers that metaphysics is repeated even in its destruction and thus is no different or the same as non-metaphysics or destroyed metaphysics (Derrida 1987). J. Hillis Miller defines deconstruction as “Deconstruction as a mode of interpretation works by a careful and circumspect entering of each textual labyrinth. The critic feels his way from figure to figure, from concept to concept, from mythical motif to mythical motif, in a repetition which is in no sense a parody. It employs, nevertheless, the subversive power present in even the most exact and ironical doubling. The deconstructive critic seeks to find, by this process of retracing, the element in the system studied which is illogical, the thread in the text in question which will unravel it all, or the loose stone which will pull down the whole building. The deconstruction, rather, annihilates the ground on which the building stands by showing that the text has already
annihilated that ground, knowingly or unknowingly. Deconstruction is not dismantling of the structure but a demonstration that it has already dismantled itself" (Theory Now and Then 126). Miller’s claim shows that deconstruction does not do anything to the text; it does not disintegrate the text. It only reveals, through a close reading the un-decidable and self-conflicting meanings of the text and how it is organized. Barbara Johnson also supports this argument, as she asserts, it is "the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification”.

Jonathon Culler also states that deconstructing a discourse is to show or reveal "how it undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical oppositions on which it relies, by identifying in the text the rhetorical operations that produces the supposed ground of argument, the key concept or premise” (Parvin Patel), Thus, for Miller, Johnson and Culler, every statement is self-subversive, aporetic, figurative, and rhetorical, and in consequence, the final meaning (if there is any) is un-decidable, suggesting that every signifier refers not to stable signified, but to more signifiers, the trace of other signifiers. De Man also argues that because a text is figurative and metaphorical, then all that remains is misreading, “rhetoric implies the persistent threat of misreading” (Blindness and Insight 285).

Deconstruction as Barbara Johnson points out, both opposes and redefines. In the case of the much publicized opposition between speech and writing, deconstruction both appears to grant to writing the priority traditionally assigned to speech redefines "writing" as difference so that it can no longer simply mean "marks on a page" but can very well also refer to that aspect of spoken speech that is normally occulted by traditional notions of what speech is. What deconstructionists are trying to make can be logically generalized as: 1. if all readings are misreading, then all readings are equally valid. 2. if there is no such a thing as objective reading, then all readings are based on subjective preferences 3. if there is no absolute truth, then everything is relative 4. to criticize is to be skeptical, to question is to dismiss.

In other words, if not absolute, then relative, if not objective, then subjective, if you are not for something, you are against it. As a radical logic, it is felt that, the core of deconstructionism is through binary opposition which means, everything is taken for its opposite. If that is so, then there exists an endless vicious circle of opposites which will never let us settle on a meaning. It means to reject all logics as being capable of being decentered but in the absent-minding actions of setting another concept instead, in total ignorance i.e. rejecting a logic as a priority which is wrong while engendering another entity. If there is no centering, then why centering? Thus, the incompatibility between deconstruction and its conservative detractors is an incompatibility of logics. While traditionalists say that a thing cannot be both A and not A, deconstructors open up ways in which A is necessarily but unpredictably already different from A. Here deconstruction is accused of not living to its own claims. That’s what judges deconstructionism against its claims due to the fact that they just question the already established concepts as totally un-acceptable, but do not question the concepts which it un-consciously establishes for itself.

“When all readings are misreading, then all the readings are equally valid” (Johnson 1980) how is it possible to maintain that some readings are better than others in a way that cannot be entirely reduced to a binary opposition? In here, she is somehow emphasizing what Heidegger stated. As she further continues to ask a just question as “but if all interpretation is misinterpretation and if all criticism (like all history) of texts can engage only with a critic’s own misconstruction, why bother to carry on the activities of interpretation and criticism?”

Derrida refuses to grant philosophy the kind of privileged status it has always claimed as the sovereign dispenser of reason (Norris 1982). Deconstruction identifies the paradoxical situations in the text on one hand and systematically dismantles them on the other. So, it has nothing to do with destruction of the text due to what Derrida was implied when critiquing Heidegar’s ideas and philosophy of Being. As you may have noticed, there is something not right among the various definitions and remarks which were set off by the giants of philosophy and deconstructionists. Miller, following Nietzsche, is of the opinion that every form of repetition implies “a world based on difference” (Parvin Patel).

The main concern in the rhetorical, allegorical and repetitive mode of deconstruction is un-decidability. Un-decidability in deconstruction is not an oscillation between two significations, or two contradictory and very determinate rules. It is not tension between two decisions, but instead, as Derrida says, “it is the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the order of calculable and the rules, is still obliged—it is of obligation that we must speak—to give itself up to the impossible decision, while taking account of law and rules”. This is exactly opposite of what Derrida said while replying to Heidegger that “every instance of the destruction of metaphysics is in fact a repetition of it as it borrows entirely from the structure of metaphysics it sets out to destroy” so based on Derrida, it must be rejected because it is obeying an internal logic which
Deconstructionally speaking, I can’t accept it. Either Derrida was wrong or there is something beyond it which is still unknown. In any case, deconstructionists are not heedful about what they theorize and what they do, though there is something for sure, that deconstruction is not destruction of the text (Barbara Johnson, as quoted in Bressler), rhetorically and groundlessly it can be taken as such, but speaking of which, it is repetition of something’s opposite in reverse way. As Barbara Johnson states “Deconstruction is not synonymous with destruction...The deconstruction of text does not proceed by random doubt or arbitrary subversion, but by the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text itself. If anything is destroyed in a deconstructive reading, it is not the text, but the claim to unequivocal domination of one mode of signifying over another” (Abram, Harpham 2009). Some other critics put their emphasis more seriously on the definitions which Derrida stated. They try to show the importance that this very deconstruction has put on every kind of text in essence

“If that’s the truth what Derrida consciously states, then as American literary field is awash with ‘ism’, like Marxism, Feminism, Freudianism and so on, and all are searching for a “discovered” meaning will undergo nothingness, because nearly all cultural criticisms were affected with the arrival of deconstructionism in 1970s. With such, instead of “text is everything”, the new generation claimed that “everything is text” and turned to analyze everything and anything in relation to literary work” (McDonald 2011).

What is worth explanation in here, would be the very term "everything is text" which Derrida asserts. Two conceptions can be inferred from such. firstly, anything is treated as the text which can be destructed as some present deconstructionists are claiming and it is a true one. Secondly, if everything is a text, what is or are the true ways of proper deconstructing? Is there a method, how is it? If not, then why saying 'deconstruction is destruction of the text'? As Miller, Kamuf and Derrida assert, therefore, all narratives pertaining to the determination of deconstruction are wide of the mark in their efforts at definition and containment on several counts. More generally still, Derrida has never presented a coherent theory of reading or analysis functions in the same manner from one text to another (Wolfreys 2003). Therefore, it is nothing of an unproved statement to claim that deconstruction is not what many state as destruction of the text and try to publicize it while practicing such. it can be taken as a misunderstanding of deconstruction method. Derrida, as quoted by Wolfreys further states that "I am not sure that deconstruction can function as a literary method as such. I am wary of the idea of methods of reading. The laws of reading are determined by that particular text that is being read. This doesn't mean that we should simply abandon ourselves to the text, or present or repeat it in a purely passive manner [...] so that one cannot prescribe one general method or reading. In this sense deconstruction is not a method". Even Derrida himself, somewhere claims deconstruction as a method of reading and somewhere disclaims it as not. Then how is it possible for deconstruction per se, to have remained and become as a method and standard in the way some practitioners claim? Like, ‘deconstruction is surely destruction of the text’ or ‘I have deconstructed the text’ or ‘a deconstruction study of whatnot?’ Not that these are just unjustified claims made by some who lack the true knowledge of it?

2.3. DECONSTRUCTION AND REALITY

If we magnify the role of meaning according to deconstructionists, we may get closer to know whether deconstruction is a kind of destruction or not. Derridean deconstruction became a tool for cultural critics. Simply stated, deconstruction is a school of thought that posits that words have no meaning. Instead, words have “traces” of meaning. The meaning of a word is continually disappearing, leaving us with only the memory, or trace, of what that meaning once was. (Similar to Heidegger’s term being, Derrida often uses the crossed-out-word trace in an effort to indicate a meaning that is simultaneously present and disappearing) (McDonald 2011).

If there is no meaning at first according to deconstructionists, then what are we destructing? Is it not just that we are trying to either examine the parts of the text for any logic so as to say “yet the opposite can be said accordingly” or showing the ambiguities and paradoxes of it and say “the meaning is not clear”? If we equate deconstruction to destruction, we, as Derrida criticizes Heidegger, then we shall have quite a new text, but it seems not to be true. Other than its general philosophy, deconstruction offered something more important. It offered the techniques to “show” how all language deconstructs itself. Is it not true? If that’s the case, we are just engaged with substitution and substituting the values, like a football game, and none is absolute.

Substitution=destruction?

Nicholas Royle states that 'Deconstruction- which is never single or homogeneous, but which can here, at least provisionally, be identified with 'the work of Derrida'- is concerned with the lucid, patient attempt to trace what has not been
read, what remains unread or unreadable within the elaboration of concepts and workings of institutions" (2000, p. 45). It is the essence that deconstruction also works based on institutions and principles, thus, simply anyone cannot call any reading a deconstruction and any meaning to be capable of deconstruction. To elaborate more, in a very great discussion, Abrams replies Derrida about his facts that meaning doesn’t exist. Based on this linguistic argument, deconstructionists conclude that since any meanings in words are so quickly diffused, we can never really communicate at all. Words no longer have meaning. Derrida claims that difference is the reason that words cannot have meanings. Hence, the task of a deconstructionist is just to illustrate how the works deconstruct themselves through an internal process. Therefore, according to what Derrida says, all language doesn’t have meaning and poem as well. Further, Derrida goes forward to say that “all the forms of “to be” are to be eschewed”, because in deconstructionist term the verb “to be” implies meaning, thus it cannot exist (McDonald 2011). If deconstructionists' theories were even remotely accurate, all verbal communication – and by extension all other forms of communication would be impossible. As New Critic Dr. M. H. Abrams of Cornell University states, “I hope that Derrida remembers that words do mean things next time someone warns him of an oncoming bus”.

If that’s again the case, there exist a great gap between those who produce literature and those who analyze it and teach it. Then, no one can tend to write beautifully because meaning is necessary for beautiful writing. Then American and our greatest hope for good literature lie not in universities but in “amateur” writing after a couple of days of basic trainings or the kids in school.

3. CONCLUSION

There might be some question which may raise up as matter of concerns about deconstruction and its practicing on text which are what are the main concerns in deconstruction trend and what is the reason for such concerns? Why there has to be many definitions if there is any at all, about deconstruction? And the most important of all, why, according to what Barbara Johnson stated earlier, varied groups enter into this trend? Do not all these differentiations and explications represent a sort of misunderstanding and misconception of deconstruction which has resulted in clarification? However, As Derrida critiques Heidegger, destruction of metaphysics is simply a repetition or reproduction of it hence, another metaphysic is being made. To what sense we can say that deconstruction is destruction then? If it is destruction of the text, then we shall not expect any meaning coming from it, but the basic truth remains that, we are just substituting the words and parts of a text according to the difference or the opposite of what has been written to state in a varied form to show that any logic can be reversed. However, we are not doing more than repeating the same text in one way or another because a text guides us just through some definite difference, in Derrida’s word.

We have not limitless options to consider the text in any way we wish, as we are just borrowing from the text as a metaphysics which we take upon ourselves to break it willy-nilly, and repeat it in our own understanding and label it so-called “destruction of the text” as it is not. As Barbara Johnson believes Deconstruction is not the destruction of the text. Considering if it is destruction, then what we make must be totally different in essence, terminology and meaning.

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