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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on phenomenological perspectives in literary criticism by first giving a brief account of the philosophical underpinnings of phenomenology and its shortcomings, second explicating how it influenced the literary theory. At last it is shown how some Persian poems can be well appreciated with reference to phenomenological hermeneutics of the poems in question. As Husserl (1963) believes, we must return to intuition rather than a range of theories, and experience structures rather than focus on phenomena. Within this framework, the human mind interferes with human nature. The investigators practice them through embarking upon the investigating domain, whereas the freedom from any misunderstanding and prejudice represents suspension. This leads to the careful scrutiny of artistic and intuitive experiences. The study concludes with the phenomenological perspectives that can be incorporated in an in-depth literary criticism.

Keywords: Phenomenological perspectives, literary criticism, hermeneutics, intuitive experiences, transcendental, phenomenological reduction, cogito, indeterminacy, concretization, horizon of expectations.

INTRODUCTION

In the first half of the 20th century in countries such as England, US, and Russia, literary criticism was moving toward getting all the more scientific and text-oriented through concentrating on the linguistic elements of the text. At the same time Germany was giving birth to theories which in the process of perception focused on the involved consciousness and thus on the subject. These theories culminated in the philosophical method called phenomenology; the founder of which was the German philosopher, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). As almost all original theories in various areas of humanity sciences have always influenced the literary theory, phenomenology soon opened its way into literary theory, and consequently, two main trends affected by phenomenology were developed: the Geneva School of critics devoted to the consciousness of the author, and the Reception Theory preoccupied with consciousness of the reader.

Originally, in the 18th century “phenomenology meant the theory of appearances fundamental to empirical knowledge, especially sensory appearances”. The term phenomenology seems to have been introduced by Johann Heinrich Lambert, a follower of Christian Wolff. Subsequently, Immanuel Kant used the term occasionally in various writings, as did Jahn Gottlieb Fichte and G. W. F. Hegel. By 1889 Franz Brentano (1995) used the term to characterize what he called “descriptive psychology”. From there Edmund Husserl took up the term for his new science of consciousness (Cited by Smith, 2005).

Phenomenology was launched by Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investigations (1900-1901, 2001 as cited by Smith, 2005). Two importantly different lines of theory came together in that monumental work: psychological theory, on the heels of Franz Brentano (1995): and logical or semantic theory, on the heels of Bernard Bolzano and Husserl's contemporaries including Gottlob Frege who founded modern logic, (cf. Smith, 2005). In the philosophical perspective and method called Phenomenology and established by Edmund Husserl, “he set out to analyze human
the objects exist independently of us in the external world, and that our
information about them is generally liable. It was this very attitude that Husserl put into question. But if we cannot be
sure of the independent existence of external things, what can we be sure of? Husserl answers that we can be
certain of the way things appear to us immediately in our consciousness. Thus, phenomenology introduced itself as
the science of human consciousness and its working mechanism; it is the study of structures of consciousness. The
structure mainly comes from its intentionality being directed towards something, i.e., the experience of or about some
object when there is an experience directed toward an object through its meaning as well as appropriate enabling
conditions. The object is historically bounded, a concept constructed by social and historical presuppositions. What
can be immediately and directly experienced is 'phenomenon' not object; therefore, the object has to be reduced to
phenomenon. This is the so-called 'phenomenological reduction' that is, to ignore or 'to put in brackets' all
preconceptions about the nature of the experience; to exclude everything not 'immanent' to consciousness; to
consider everything as registered in my mind not as existed outside my consciousness. This method is called
'epoche' (suspension of all assumptions about the object, including the question whether or not the object of
consciousness is real or illusory). In fact, phenomenology is the study of "phenomena": things as they are in our
experience. This consists of two sides. The first is part of what it is for the experience to be experienced
(phenomenological) and part of what it is for the experience to be (ontological). The kind of pure phenomenon, to
which Husserl's study is devoted, is not the random, individually experienced entity but the universal essence: the
true definition of phenomenon can be what is essentially and universally unchanging about the object. The
phenomenological slogan 'Back to the things themselves' is quiet illustrative of this essentialist approach. That is why
Husserl's phenomenological method of inquiry is called 'transcendental': to understand the essence of the things, and
to lay bare the 'deep structures' of the act of consciousness, we cannot perceive these from inside our subjectively
lived experiences. Terry Eagleton (1996) states "We have to rise, get out of the lived experiences, and view the
phenomenon from above".

The totality of Husserl's phenomenological ideas emphasizes the inevitable dependence of the object's existence
on the thinking subject. Husserl argues that "the gap between the mind and the world should be removed. The world
is what appears to me. The world and my consciousness are two sides of the same coin. Whether we hold this
subjective perspective as a radical reaction against Positivism that ignored all about human's role in grasping the
reliable knowledge of the world, or as a solution for crises of the early 20th century western man after having
undergone the turmoil and terror of the first World War, we cannot deny the key role given to human subject in this
philosophy; the subject is seen as the origin of all meanings",

Classical phenomenologists practiced three distinguishable methods. Firstly, they described a type of experience
just as they found it in their own past experience. Thus, Husserl (1963) and Merleau-Ponty (1996) spoke of pure
descriptions of lived experiences. Secondly, they interpreted a type of experience by relating it to relevant features of
context. In this vein, Heidegger (1982) spoke of hermeneutics, the art of interpretation in context, especially social
and linguistic context. Thirdly, there is an analysis concerning the form of a type of experience. In short, all the
classical phenomenologists practiced analysis of experience, highlighting notable features for further elaboration.

In recent philosophy of mind, the term "phenomenology" is often restricted to the characterization of sensory
qualities of seeing, hearing, etc. However, our experience is normally much richer in content than mere sensation.
Accordingly, phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience ranging from perception, thought,
memory, imagination, emotion, desire, and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity,
including linguistic activity. The structure of these forms of experience typically involves what Husserl (1963) called
"intentionality", that is, the directedness of experience toward things in the world, the property of consciousness as a
consciousness of or about something. In this way, the experience "intends" things only through particular concepts,
thoughts, ideas, images, etc. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience, and are distinct from the
things they mean.

CRITICAL REVIEW OF HUSSELL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

The best known critique of Husserl's ideas was carried out by his celebrated pupil, the German philosopher Martin
Heidegger (1889-1976). To show the shortcomings of the concept of phenomenology, I draw upon the opinions of
Heidegger and the English Marxist critic Terry Eagleton (1943- ). As these two scholars argue, two issues are not
fairly taken into account in Husserlian philosophy: language and history. Actually the social dimension of the
language is underestimated. In order to grasp the essence of the things, Husserl speaks about a purely private or
internal sphere of experience. An experience, in order to be totally private, needs to be totally separated from, and
independent of language. But, since all experiences involve language, and language is by nature social, is such a kind of experience ever possible? How is someone ever able to experience, without possessing a language to identify that experience? For Husserl what makes the experience meaningful is not language; "language is not more than a secondary activity that gives names to the meanings that one somehow already possesses." (Eagleton, 1996: 52) Husserl's view of language is in contrast with what the linguistic revolution of the 20th century, from Saussurian linguistics to contemporary linguistics, endeavored to clarify: "meaning is not something simply 'expressed' or 'reflected' in the language, it is actually 'produced' by it." (Eagleton, 1996: 52) Therefore, if we can have meanings and experiences because we have a language to have them in, there can be no wholly pure and private experience untouched by the social contaminations of language.

The other defect of phenomenology is its ignorance of history. Heidegger argued that despite its focus on reality as actually experienced, Phenomenology's stance toward the world remains contemplative and unhistorical. Surely human meanings are in a deep sense historical. They are historical in the sense that we human beings are "thrown' into particular bodies in a particular location at a particular historical time; so, we are condemned to look out from a starting-point which we [could neither] choose [nor] leave behind." (Harland, 1999: 201) Besides we are born into a world where everything is previously shaped by human cares, interests, and purposes. As a result, can any consciousness ever restore the pure essential states of affairs? Everything we know and understand is inevitably time-bound and predetermined by history and society.

THE GENEVA SCHOOL OF CRITICISM

Phenomenology in its latest serious development was manifested in the Geneva School which illustrates new practices and perspectives. The Geneva school of criticism originated in Francophone Switzerland in the 1930s and in Georges Poulet's books (the first one published in 1949) showed its full philosophical orientation. Among the literary criticism prevalent around mid-20th century, Geneva school is a rare case in its author-oriented view of literature and in its indifference to the linguistic medium of the text. Geneva critics perceived the text as a consciousness (of the author). Poulet argued that the act of reading is a process of opening oneself to an 'alien' consciousness:

"[In the act of reading] I am aware of a rational being, of a consciousness; the consciousness of another, no different from the one I automatically assume in every human being I encounter, except in this case the consciousness is open to me, welcomes me, lets me look deep inside itself. (Poulet, 1969: 54)"

Following Husserl's 'bracketing' of the real object and all assumptions about it, Geneva critics put into brackets, indeed ignored, the historical context of the literary work, its author (the biographical author), conditions of production and readership and concentrated only on the text. But the text itself is reduced to a pure embodiment of the author's consciousness. This is the point where Geneva school diverges from the traditional, biographical approach and employs modernist techniques: Geneva critics do not refer to the author's biography, indeed to nothing outside the text. As far as, for them, the complex totality of all the stylistic and semantic aspects of a text reflect a unifying essence, that is the author's mind, the critic should not rely on anything external, but those aspects of the author's mind manifesting themselves in the work itself. Geneva critics are concerned with the 'deep structures' of this mind, thus they study all works of a particular author in order to hunt unities. They also set out to characterize the cogito, which is the essential kind of the grasp that a writer directs toward reality. "The 'world' of a literary work is not an objective reality, but what in German is called lebenswelt, reality as actually organized and experienced by an individual subject." (Eagleton, 1996: 51) Phenomenological criticism of the Geneva school focuses on such issues as "the way the author experiences time and space; the way he/she establishes relation between self and other; the way he/she perceives the material world." (Eagleton, 1996: 51)

RECEPTION THEORY (CONSTANCE SCHOOL)

Phenomenology was influential on literary theory in some other different way: the Constance school shaped by a group of critics at the University of Constance in Germany, focused not upon the writer's but upon the reader's consciousness. Since their views, widespread under the title of Reception Aesthetics, are distinguishable as two main trends, the present essay introduces them in two different sections: Wolfgang Iser's theory and that of Hans-Robert Jauss.
To introduce Iser, it is necessary to start by discussing the source of influence he drew upon: Roman Ingarden (1893-1970), the polish phenomenologist who was, in his own turn, influenced by Husserl, and offered interesting theories on the internal ontological constitution and articulation of the text and its fictional world. He argues that the intrinsic ontological complexity of a literary artwork originates, first of all, from its being heteronomous, "existing both autonomously in its own rights, and at the same time depending upon the constitutive acts of consciousness of a reader."(McHale, 1993: 30) Although not real, the fictional world (made up of characters, actions, places, objects, etc.) has objective existence, in the sense that different readers can project it. It is projected from the mind of the reader but is not simply in the mind of the reader.

To describe the phenomenon of reading, Ingarden uses a specific terminology and introduces two terms, later employed frequently by Iser: indeterminacy or gap and concretization. Compared to the real world objects, the fictional objects of the text are strange, paradoxical, cloudy in character, and potentially ambiguous. Ontologically speaking, "the real world objects have no indeterminate points, […] while fictional objects have ontological gaps." (McHale, 1993: 30) Gilbert Sorrentino in Mulligan Stew, masterly depicts the ontologically indeterminate structure of the fictional world, here a fictional house:

"It is a rather odd house, to say the least. There is the living room and the den, but we have not been able to find any other rooms. It seems as if there are other rooms, but when we approach them [...] they are simply not there. [...] At the side of the living room, a staircase leads 'nowhere'. [...] it simply leads to a kind of ... haziness, in which one knows there is supposed to be a hallway and bedroom doors: but, there is absolutely nothing. (1981: 30)"

Since the words are, by nature, general and schematic, the more the writer provides information, descriptions, and epithets to clarify the fictional world, the more indeterminate it is likely to be. Therefore, a text can never remove its inherent indeterminacies and gaps, and they remain for the reader to fill them out through the act of concretization of the text. Concretization is, as recognized by Ingarden, a creative activity, since the reader actively reconstructs the world of the text, and this reconstruction is a temporal process developing progressively through time. It means that reading is not a linear activity starting from point A, continuing along a linear path, and finally ending at point B. Instead, it is a dynamic activity in which we read backwards and forwards simultaneously, predicting and recollecting; our expectations constructed upon the past sentences are modified both by the future sentences and by the retrospective revisions.

In his essay 'Indeterminacy and the Reader's Response', Iser identifies two steps in describing the relationship between text and reader; the first step is to indicate the special qualities of a literary text by which it is distinguished from other kinds of texts. The second step is to name and analyze the basic causes- among which the main one is indeterminacy- of the response to literary works. For the first step Iser believes a non-literary text presents an object which exists with equal determinacy outside and independent of it. By contrast, the literary text actually creates its object by the reader's participation; there is no concrete object corresponding to it in the real world. As a result, the reader can not refer to any definite or independent facts in order to judge whether the text has presented its object by the reader's participation; there is no concrete object corresponding to it in the real world. As a result, the literary text's denying this possibility of verification –a possibility provided by non-literary text- arises a certain amount of indeterminacy.

Also the text's certain formal conditions give rise to indeterminacy. The literary objects come into being by a variety of 'schematized views' –a term coined by Ingarden. "Each single view will generally reveal only one representative aspect. It, therefore determines the literary object from one respect, and at the same time it [extends] the need for new determinations" (Newton, 1997: 197); in other words, a literary object is by nature never fully determined, and between the 'schematized views', there is a vast land of indeterminacy that offers a free play of interpretation.

The indeterminate sections or gaps of literary text are not to be regarded as a defect: on the contrary, they are a basic element for the aesthetic response and the fundamental preconditions for reader's participation. They are, in other words, the basis of a textual structure in which the reader's part is incorporated. From what has been so far discussed about Iser's reception theory, it is obvious that he believes in the text's possessing an objective structure even if this structure is potentially capable of bringing about a variety of different interpretations and responses.
HANS-ROBERT JUASS (1921-1997)

The main source of influence on Jauss is Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics. Gadamer (1900-2002) in his own turn was influenced by philosophy of Heidegger. He borrows from Heidegger the philosophical premises that temporality and historicality—a situation in one's present that looks back to the past and, at the same time, anticipates the future—is an inseparable part of each individual's being, and that language, like temporality, pervades all aspects of human experience. In applying these philosophical assumptions to the reading and understanding of a literary text, Gadamer, in his major book Truth and Method (1960) uses two central metaphors: dialogue and fusion. Readers bring to the text a 'pre-understanding' which is made by their own temporal and personal 'horizons' "and as an 'I', situated in his or her present time, address questions to the text as a 'Thou', but only with a receptive openness, that allows the text [...] to readdress its own questions to the reader. The understood meaning of a text is, thus, an event which is always the product of a 'fusion of the horizons' that a reader brings to the text and that the text brings to the reader." (Abrams, 2005: 137)

At the beginning of his lecture 'Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory', Jauss enumerates the defects of Formalism and Orthodox Marxism. According to him, both of the schools stop at the point of bridging the gap between literature and history, between the aesthetic and historical approaches. In doing so, they deprive literature of a key dimension that is simultaneously both aesthetic and historical: the dimension of the work's reception. He argues that traditional literary historians have related the literary work to its origin and production—the author's mind. This approach is also defective, since it does not take into account the reception of the literary work by the readers in different historical eras. The reception of a work is actually a further stage of its production due to the readers' active participation in creating the meaning.

Jauss coins the phrase 'horizon of expectations' to identify the specific norms and assumptions that are brought to the text by the audience of a specific historical period. These expectations may be satisfied, suppressed, or denied by the text. They undergo changes in the course of the time, and that is why the same text receives radically different receptions and responses from the audience of different periods. Jauss advocates the literary historian to reconstruct the past horizon of expectations in order to illuminate the present, and to trace the history of the unstable receptions and the variety of meanings attributed to the same text in the course of the variable receptions. These very receptions of the literary works reveal the norms and assumptions imprinted upon a great many minds (those of the communities of readers), while the authorial production shows the single mind of the individual writer. Jauss prefers the former over the latter as the main subject of the literary historian's study, because he believes the former to be far more typical, than the latter, of the social and cultural conditions of the past.

He concludes that works are related to their periods differently: some totally belong to their time so that they satisfy or even confirm horizon of expectations, while the others reject the expectations of their time. If they are ahead of the time, they should wait for the arrival of the new horizon of the expectations in order to be appreciated by the readers.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES IN PERSIAN POETRY

From the ups and downs of our childhood, there is still a poem line which can be harkened in our heart and mind, the same as can the sounds of the school bell and of the writing in ink-pen:

Tick-tock of clock says what to the hearer?

"ye the clever, be alert," says it.

This line was one of the typical writing samples written on the blackboard by the teacher's white fingers for the practice of good hand-writing, nowadays known as orthography. It was then the sound of wood blooming in the fireplace and snowflakes over the trees, while there was the sensational dance of words amidst the teacher's fingers glittering like the white snow. We now realize that the composer of the line explores new associations in a plain style—free from turgidity—and in the light of a transparent experience, and of a direct and intuitive knowledge. The poet has explored a significant association between the "tick-tock" of clock and "alertness," which is like a direct line that binds the phenomenon to the knowledge. To discover such significant associations, the poet must wash his own eyes and see in a different way (cf. Sepehri, 1997). In a natural approach, an object by itself exists, and the existential scale of the phenomenon is subject to its naturally located mass. From this point of view, tick-tock of clock is an assumed and arbitrary symbol for the sound that denotes the time process. However, from a philosophical point
of view, along with an existential and intuitive approach, it signifies a meaning transcendental to the process of time, which originates from the substance of the phenomenon, not from its form. The meaning is implied by an ongoing direct and intuitive experience -- free from any kind of pre-supposition and pre-judgment. This is the unique nature and core of phenomenological philosophy, within which the value assigned to the knowledge (of the subject) is as much as it can be named a phenomenon, and as is possible to be represented as a phenomenon. Phenomenology is an attempt to pass from pure theorizing to direct experiencing, and from natural approach and mental image to transcendental meaning and knowledge. According to the phenomenological point of view, along with the knowledge of our common mentality and perceptions, our knowledge of the object is developed.

Phenomenology explores the origin of knowledge by which the object or phenomenon is deemed as the "signifier" that indicates a transcendental "signified". The transcendental meaning arising from the nature of the phenomenon, is neither in the natural location of the object, nor in the mental image reflected from the object, but is originated from the interaction of the subject and the mind. Thus, in this way the world of phenomena is developed through the common perception. Phenomenology as the philosophy of knowledge is regarded as one way of theorizing the epistemology of contemporary western philosophy by theorists among whom Husserl stands out.

As the foregoing suggests, according to the Husserl's structure of epistemology, the object or the entity of knowledge is suspended and placed within two parentheses so that its transcendental meaning or nature come into existence within the process of noticing by the knowledge perceiver (me) to the known (the object) in the knowledge perceiver's consciousness. This entity is regarded as the residual (synthesis) which is generated by the knowledge perceiver's noticing the known. For example, the rain is an entity in its natural location; however, when it interacts with the artistic mentality of Golchine Guilani (cf. Mirfakhraee, 1999), its meaning signifies a transformed entity that associates with the poet's sweet childhood memories in his subconscious thoughts and feelings:

With the melody and
With plentiful gems, it's
Raining again,
Hitting the roof of the house,
Reminding me of the rainy day,
Passing one old day,
So sweet, so nice¹

By the stream of consciousness, the poet flashbacks the transcendental meaning of rain going deep into his childhood world where he heard the secret stories from the birds' voice, and from the wind sound, the hidden secrets of life. The world whose pleasant lullaby institutionalizes this lasting belief in the poet's historical memory that: if it were not for the sun's favorable attention to the nature, the existence of trees would be nothing but wooden legs; therefore, this natural "existence" would not have been materialized into the transcendental "existence" (which originates from the sun). The day has taken its beauty, attraction and loveliness from the sunshine:

Day! O' thou lovely day
All loveliness comes from the sun
Oh! beautiful and green trees

¹The translation is from the Persian poems by Golchine Guilani including the rain that appears in Mirfakhraee (1999: 52-60).
All beauty comes from the sun

The poet envisaging the other layers of the natural perspectives refers to the non-setting sun, the natural phenomenon, at a wider perspective furnished with the everlasting secrets and with the heavenly premonition from the refreshing, gem-shedding, and lovely rain so that he arrives at the "truth road" from the "nature home" bestowing his intuitive experiences acquired by going through the transitional process from the "nature home" to the "truth road" as an invaluable legacy of his child:

Listen to me, my child,
Life is beautiful,
Whether dark or bright,
Beautiful it is; beautiful indeed!

My child! Those who have exonerated themselves from the life routines have opened their eyes to the expanse of tomorrow, and see life, whether dark or bright, as beautiful. Whatever exists is beautiful, and whatever is not beautiful does not exist, save the weed wrongly in the life plantation, or dry wood wrongly grown out of the tree trunk.

Also, when the sea struck the poet (Royaee, 1965: 38-39), it turns into a new entity conversing with the poet:

The sea has a different language,
With the waves, syllable invasion,
With the sands, speech of foams
… the sea has a different language:

With the melody of bubbles
Within the crowd of water uproar
The ebullience of sacred words
In the vague sounds of whirlpool

Its waves are associated with the invasion of syllables in the mind while it sands with the speech of the sea foam. The poet hears the melody of bubbles in the crowd of water uproar, and in the vague sounds of whirlpool, the ebullience of sacred words together with such a defamiliarized attitude and "universal meta-being" while verbally communicating with the sea.

CONCLUSION

Although Phenomenology is a philosophical school of thought, it can have extensive implications for literature, particularly to the study and criticism of mystic literature because of its own hermeneutic nature. The philosophy is an attempt to reform the structure of cognition based upon two pillars: (a) epistemological and (b) methodological. Its epistemological concern whose forming components include love, attraction and intuition has a significant relation with the mystic literature. Further, its methodological concern is based upon suspending the mental pre-judgments

2 The translation is from the Persian poems by Royaee (1965: 38-39)
and pre-assumptions, and upon reducing the multiple instances to general, but original infrastructures, which can play a crucial role in keeping the mind away from literary stereotypes. Thus, it is deemed effective in making literary criticism and judgment transparent and dynamic. There seems to be a direct relation between the philosophy of phenomenology and literary criticism to the extent that the former can serve the latter by freeing the mind of literary critics from pre-assumptions, pre-suppositions and pre-judgments.
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